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At the end of this academic year
Professor J. Howard Toelle retires
from the faculty of the Law School.
Mr. Russell Smith, speaking at a
luncheon in Mr. Toelle's honor, per-
haps epitomized the thirty years of
distinguished service which he has
rendered to our Law School and to
the legal profession in the simple
phrase "orderly presentation of the
law." No higher tribute can be
earned by a man who makes legal
education his life. Whether lectur-
ing or writing in his field, Mr.
Toelle is characteristically clear, or-
derly and forceful. Two generations
of Montana lawyers have been ben-
efited from his presentation of the
law, not only as students, but as
practitioners and judges as well.
The salutory influence of his teaching and writing is woven into the fabric
of Montana jurisprudence.
The Montana Law Review was conceived and inaugurated by Mr.
Toelle in 1940. From that time to the present he has served in the official
capacity of faculty adviser to the Review-but to the students responsible
for its publication he has much more. They know him to be the motivating
force behind its 17 volumes, the person who has not only formed its policies
and assisted in the selection of its articles, but one who has made many and
valuable contributions.
For all these many services, we say "THANK YOU."
NOTES
THE CENSORSHIP OF MOVING PICTURES:
AN OPEN QUESTION
Today one of the most important media for the communication of
ideas is the motion picture. While magazines, newspapers and the radio
may devote more time and space to political and social subjects, the percent-
age of total film production dealing with these issues is steadily rising.
Moreover, consideration of themes alone in determining the effect of films
on the viewing public does not reflect adequately their influence. A film
labeled "musical comedy", for example, may through its combination of
character, plot and setting have a significant impact on audience attitudes,
aspirations, and behavior. Customary content surveys do not adequately
reflect the full impact of motion picture content on public opinion. In ad-
dition to the main feature, movie patrons see newsreels, documentaries,
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travel films, and other short subjects. The main features, themselves, are
not always in one content category alone.1
The significance of the motion picture as an organ of public opinion
is due not only to the nature of movie content but also to the technological
features of the medium. Dramatization through a unique combination of
sight and sound makes the ideas presented by movies comprehensible to
more of the audience than is the case in any other medium except television.'
The focusing of an intense light on a screen, the dramatizing of fact and
opinion, the semi-darkness of the room where distracting ideas and sugges-
tions are eliminated, all contribute to the effectiveness of movies in shaping
and changing attitudes.
A medium of such importance is naturally subject to considerable re-
straint. Organized interest groups, possessing potential power of boycott,
can cause a producer to abandon certain stories, or make changes in screen
plays. Another threat Hollywood feels from these groups is their political
power to get restrictive legislation passed. Religious, social, professional,
racial, national, and business groups actively apply such pressure.
A second factor limiting movie expression is the system of self-regula-
tion embodied in the Motion Picture Production Code. About ninety-five
per cent of all pictures released in the United States receive the approval
of the Production Code Authority before release.'
As a result of these various nonlegal restraints, even the complete limi-
tation of legal censorship would not result in the fullest development of the
motion picture as a contributor to the formation of public opinion.
Under a Constitution which tries to minimize arbitrary restraint on
speech and press, state and municipal censorship of motion pictures has oc-
curred with almost no judicial control. Movies have been cut or banned by
permanent censorship boards in advance of exhibition, removed from exhibi-
tion by police or licensing officials, and withdrawn under informal pressure
from city officials. The argument for censorship is usually protection of
community morality. But in fact, broad statutory language and limited
judicial review have made possible the elimination of films on the basis of
highly subjective views of morality or for reasons quite unrelated to moral
standards.' Only recently has the United States Supreme Court begun to
remedy this abuse.'
Montana apparently has no movie censorship problem, although under
the present statutes, such a problem could possibly arise. A general statute'
which prohibits the exhibition of indecent pictures would probably not be
stretched to include movies. However, Revised Codes of Montana (1947),
Section 94-3573 provides:
'Fiske & Handel, Motion Picture Re8earch: Content and Audience Analysis, Journal
of Marketing, Oct. 1946, pp. 129-134.
'Dale, Communication8 by Picture, COMMUNICATIONS IN MODRN SOCIE'ry, 72
(Schramm ed. 1948).
8Shurlock, The Motion Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS OF THE AMEInCAN ACAD-
EmY 140 (1947).
'Note, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
'Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, Commissioner of Education of New York, et al., 343
U.S. 495, 96 L. Ed. 1098, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
6REV. CODES OF MONT., § 94-3603 (1947).
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Every person who shall exhibit moving pictures wherein are shown
or exhibited to the public any scenes or pictures depicting bur-
glaries, train robberies, or other acts which would constitute a
felony, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
When considering the criminal theme of so many moving pictures currently
being produced, it becomes obvious that convictions could become rife under
this statute. As a practical matter the statute exists as an anachronism.
Probabilities of arrests made under its authority would seem remote, and
it is not believed that a conviction rendered under it would be affirmed by a
federal court.
Historically, motion pictures have had a difficult time gaining recogni-
tion as a medium entitled to constitutional protection. A major obstacle
which existed for 37 years was the Supreme Court decision in Mutual Film
Corporation v. Industrial Commission,' which held motion pictures outside
the free speech clauses of a state constitution.' The Court used an unsound
constitutional criterion when it excluded movies from the free speech area
on the basis that they are primarily a business. In that case Justice Mc-
Kenna said:
It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures
is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit,
like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regard-
ed by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the
country, or as organis of public opinion.
All of this was changed, however, in the recent pronouncement of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Joseph Burstyn Inc. v.
Wilson, Comnissioner of Education of New York.' In that case a license for
the exhibition of a motion picture entitled The Miracle was rescinded by
the appropriate New York authorities on the ground that the picture was
''sacrilegious" within the meaning of the statute requiring the denial of a
license, if a film is "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is
of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite
to crime." The Court based its reversal solely on the ground that the New
York statute is an "unconstitutional abridgement of free speech and a free
press." t
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Burstyn case after re-
viewing the Mutual case, said:
In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York,' this
Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which the
first amendment guarantees against abridgement by the federal
government is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment from invasion by state action.
That principle has been followed and reaffirmed to the present
day. Since this series of decisions came after the Mutual decision,
'236 U.S. 230, 59 L. Ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915).
'The Mutual decision approved an Ohio statute which provided that all films shown
in Ohio were to be approved in advance by a state censor board. A companion case
upheld a similar state censorship statute of Kansas. Mutual Film Corporation v.
Hodges, 236 U.S. 248, 59 L. Ed. 561, 35 Sup. Ct. 393 (1915).
'Supra, note 5. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, Commissioner of Education of New
York, et al., 343 U.S. 495, 96 L. Ed. 1098, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
-28 U.S. 652, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925).
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the present case is the first to present squarely to us the question
whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which
the first amendment, through the fourteenth, secures to any form of
'speech' or 'the press.'
The Court then discussed as follows the character of the New York statute
and its application:
In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of 'sacri-
legious' given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon
a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious
views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and pow-
erful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restrain-
ing control over motion pictures in a censor. Since the term 'sacri-
legious' is the sole standard under attack here, it is not necessary
for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor motion
pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to pre-
vent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different ques-
tion from the one now before us.
Thus, the Court narrowed the permissible area for prior restraint on mo-
tion pictures, leaving however, an undecided region that was to be explored
by two state decisions less than a year later.
The first of these decisions is Superiar Films v. Department of Educa-
tion.'1 The controlling Ohio Code provision' stated that "only such films
as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of censors of moral, edu-
cational or amusing and harmless character shall be passed."
The motion picture, "M", as shown by the certificate was rejected for
the following reasons, among others: "1. There is a conviction that the
effect of this picture on unstable persons of any age level could lead to a
serious increase in immorality and crime. 2. Presentation of actions and
emotions of child killer emphasizing complete perversion without serving
any valid educational purpose. Treatment of perversion creates sympathy
rather than a constructive plan for dealing with perversion."
The plaintiff film company relied largely upon the Burstyn decision
and asserted that motion pictures are a mode of expression entitled to the
same protection as "speech" and "the press," and that violation of this
guaranty is protected from infringement by the state by the fourteenth
amendment to The Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, after reviewing the Burstyn decision, said:
We conclude that, although a motion picture may not be rejected
because of 'sacrilegious' expressions or portrayals, there still re-
mains a limited field in which decency and morals may be protected
from the impact of an offending motion picture film by prior re-
straint under proper criteria. As we view it, the United States
Supreme Court has not ipso facto taken away all community con-
trol of moving pictures by censorship, and this court will not do so
under the claim of complete unconstitutionality of censorship laws.
In answer to the plaintiff's contention that the statute offered a too
indefinite criterion for censorship, the Ohio Court said that the general
'159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953).
"G w. CODES oF OHIO, § 154-47b (1943).
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words in the statute "were found to get precision from the sense and experi-
ence of men." The court, because of the absence of evidence showing that
the defendant had abused its discretion, refused to review the record on its
merits and denied the plaintiff's petition. There Were two dissents on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional.
Less than a month later the case of Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board
of Regents' was decided by the New York Court of Appeals. The censor-
ship body determined that the motion picture, La Ronde, was not entitled
to be licensed for public exhibition on the ground that it was "immoral"
and would "tend to corrupt morals" within the meaning of the state law.
The court described the film in the following manner:
The film from beginning to end deals with promiscuity, adultery,
fornication, and seduction. It portrays ten episodes with a nar-
rator. Except for the husband and wife episode, each deals with an
illicit amorous adventure between two persons, one of the two part-
ners becoming the principal in the next. ... At the very end, the
narrator reminds the audience of the author's thesis: 'It is the
story of everyone.'
The plaintiff contended that the statute was invalid because it imposed a
prior restraint upon the exercise of free speech and press, and that the
standard was too vague and indefinite to satisfy the standards of due pro-
cess.
The court first considered whether motion pictures, as part of the press,
are altogether exempt from prior restraint or censorship. In answering this
question in the negative, the court relied principally upon the Burstyn de-
cision, quoting this portion of that case: "It does not follow that the. Con-
stitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every
kind at all times and at all places." The opinion suggests that the motion
picture under consideration represented a "clear and present danger" to
society and concluded that the statute in question, as a protective measure,
was a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power.
The court next considered the standard applied. Section 212 of the
Education Law provides that a motion picture shall not be licensed if it is
"obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a char-
acter that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime."
(Italics supplied). The court stated that it was concerned only with the
words italicized. The court said that the terms "immoral" and "morals"
must be taken to refer to the moral standards of the community, and there-
fore the standards of any special and particular segment of the whole popu-
lation were not to control. The court decided that by "immorality," the
legislature meant "sexual immorality" and then made the following state-
ment: "It should be remembered that we are not here dealing with a moral
concept about which our people widely differ; sexual immorality is con-
demned throughout our land." A gradation of language in the statute pro-
ceeding from " obscene" to "indecent " to "immoral" also was pointed out,
the court seeming to imply that a lesser degree of evil was necessary for the
censorship of the last than of the first.
The remaining question before the court was whether the statute was
"35 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953).
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properly invoked against the motion picture La Ronde. The court answered
the query thus:
Although vulgar pornography is avoided, suggestive dialogue and
action are present throughout and not merely incidentally, depict-
ing promiscuity as the natural and normal relation between the
sexes, whether married or unmarried. Can we disagree with the
judgment that such a picture will tend to corrupt morals? To do
so would close our eyes to the obvious facts of life.
The court refused to form an independent judgment as to the picture
and affirmed the order of the Regents.
There was a concurring opinion written by Judge Desmond which went
further in every respect than the majority opinion. It is perhaps enough
to say that his opinion of La, Ronde was that it had no other content than
an undue emphasis on the carnal side of the sex relationship.
A penetrating analysis of every facet of the case was present in a
trenchant dissent by Judge Dye. He stated that in a case involving civil
rights the reviewing court is bound to re-examine the whole record of the
original hearing. The pictures are reviewed, he said, by a board that passes
judgment based solely on what the members of the board itself happen to
think about it at a given time, and added that the appellate court was left
at the great disadvantage of not knowing what standards guided the agency
in making its determination. He concluded by suggesting that the term
"immoral" and the words "tend to corrupt morals" be stricken from the
statute, since they are void of any definite meaning.
These two cases were both heard on appeal at the October term of the
United States Supreme Court in 1953. " The judgments were reversed in a
per curiam decision citing only the Burstyn case. However, a concurring
opinion was filed by Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black agreed. In
a short summary of the law of free speech and more specifically of prior
restraint, Justice Douglas mentions the case of Near v. Minnesota' as inter-
preting the first amendment to preclude previous restraints upon publica-
tion. The Burstyn case, he goes on, brought motion pictures within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the first and fourteenth amendments. He
concludes, thusly:
The first and the fourteenth amendments say that Congress and
the states shall make 'no law' which abridges freedom of speech or
of the press. In order to sanction a system of censorship I would
have to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that 'no law'
is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take the step. In this
nation every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of
expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
This unequivocal statement by an associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court would, at first blush, seem to suggest an answer to a problem
that has been plaguing the motion picture industry for almost a half a
century. Were movies at last to be declared free from the heavy hand of
state and municipal censorship? Seven, months later the answer was hand-
ed down by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of American Civil
1346 U.S. 587, 98 L. Ed. 329, 74 Sup. Ct. 286 (1954).
283 U.S. 697, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
[Vol. 17,
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Liberties Union v. Chicago.' T)he court was called upon to review the cen-
sorship of The Miracle. Strangely enough, this was the same moving pic-
ture that was involved in the decision of the Supreme Court of The United
States in the Burstyn case. In referring to the Burstyn case the Illinois
court said: ". . . we do not regard [this decision] as automatically com-
pelling us to overrule our prior approval of the Chicago censorship ordi-
nance." The case was then sent back to the trial court for a more complete
factual review.
What then is the status of moving picture censorship? The remainder
of this comment will be devoted to an attempt to answer that question.
The first step towards this goal must be a complete analysis of The
Supreme Court opinion that overruled the Commercial and Superior cases.
tn considering the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas, we must begin by
reminding ourselves that the views expressed in this opinion apparently
were not shared by a majority of the Court.
One possible reason for the reversal is that the statutes invoked by the
state courts, although applicable to some films that would be censorable,
were so broad as to sanction the censorship of films which may not constitu-
tionally be censored. The term, immoral, which was the basis of censorship
in the Commercial case, has a variety of meanings varying according to
time, geography, and to some extent, subjective judgment." Funk and
Wagnall's Dictionary says the term, immoral, may and does include illicit
sexual behavior. But, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the meaning is
not limited to sexual impurity, but includes in addition offenses hostile "to
public welfare." Corpus Juris includes as part of the definition, conduct
that is "inimical to rights or interests of others," ''corrupt," ''depraved,"
and sometimes "unprofessional" conduct. A term of such vague and un-
defined limits, since it would fail to furnish the objective criterion necessary
to insure that there shall be no interference with the exercise of rights se-
cured by due process of law, could easily be the reason for the Supreme
Court's reversal. In the Superior case, the picture transgressed the statute,
because it was "harmful." One need hardly mention that "harmful" is
every bit as indefinite as "immoral," and would be subject to the same in-
firmities. Employing this sort of criteria, a board of censors could sup-
press half of the moving pictures it reviewed.
A second possible basis for the Supreme Court's decision, and probably
the one that demands the deepest probing, is that the films themselves did
not possess those qualities which would justify their censorship. There
seems to be two generally recognized exceptions to the constitutional doc-
trine that forbids censorship of speech and the press. One is the "clear and
present danger test" and the other, "the primary requirements of de-
cency" concept.
These two concepts have cropped up as indistinguishable parts of the
same theory, as completely independent ideas, and as interrelated facets
of a single rule. Striving for a more lucid analysis, we will consider them
separately.
"3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
"Parmelee v. United States, 72 App. D.C. 203, 113 F.2d 729 (1940) ; United States v.
Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119 (S. D. N. Y. 1913) ; Foy Productions v. Graves, 253 App. Div.
475, 3 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1938) ; CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE.
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The "clear and present danger" test was first applied by Mr. Justice
Holmes in 1919.' Generally, it stands for the proposition that speech can-
not be restrained unless there is a clear and present danger that the speech
will produce a serious substantive evil that the state has power to prevent.
Since the Supreme Court agrees that moving pictures are entitled to the
freedom of expression and protection provided by the first and fourteenth
amendments, there is every reason to believe that it will appraise the con-
tent of such medium in the light of the "clear and present danger" theory.
In the Commercial case, the New York Court of Appeals referred to
the "clear and present danger" theory, stating that the vices bred by a
motion picture which panders to base human emotions represent a "clear
and present danger" to the body social.1' The Supreme Court of The
United States, however, defines "clear and present danger" as a more
restricted doctrine: "Neither 'inherent tendency' nor 'reasonable ten-
dency' to cause a substantive evil is enough to justify a restriction of free
expression." '  The dissenting opinion in the Commercial Pictures case
quotes the following review of La Ro'nde appearing in the Los Angeles
Daily News:
Here is a lovely motion picture, a gay, a glad, a sad, a sentimental
movie . . .about the Vienna of candlelight and carriages, of wine,
women and waltzes . . . a picture about illicit love, but it is told
without prudishness and with a deftness, discretion and under-
standing that make it more moral than most censor shackled pic-
tures on the subject.
This critique, and many others in the same tenor, illustrate that reasonable
men are likely to hold different opinions as to whether the showing of such
a motion picture will cause a substantive evil. It would seem to follow
that there was not, at least conclusively, a "clear and present danger"
sufficiently imminent to override the protection of The United States Con-
stitution.' The least the defendant should be entitled to is a prima facie
case that the picture does not constitute a "clear and present danger,"
with the burden of proof on the state to show that it does.
The difficulties that arise in the application of the "clear and present
danger" test to moving pictures are numerous. If it were established that
seeing a certain movie would, in fact, induce normal persons to engage in
sexual conduct that seriously deviates from the accepted community stand-
ards, there might be constitutional power to censor the movie. But, a major
difficulty arises, because it is impossible to know that the motion picture
will have that effect; instead, the effect of any movie upon the action of
normal individuals is in the realm of prophecy. The issue would seem to
be whether a particular movie will adversely affect the moral conduct of
the normal viewer, and whether the possibility of that adverse effect is
sufficiently great to constitute the "clear danger" needed to outweigh the
social values of the free distribution of the movie and the harm to society
'Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L. Ed. 470, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).
"Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York,
305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1953).
'Bridges v. State of California, Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct. of in and for Los
Angeles County, 314 U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941).
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1939).
[Vol. 17,
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that would result if this type of motion picture were subject to censorship.
There is a marked absence of dependable information concerning the effect
of "immoral" movies on human conduct. 'The most recent case upholding
censorship on moving pictures has recognized this problem.' There, the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in considering the application of the "clear and
present" danger doctrine, said:
We agree that the determination that a film or book is obscene
must rest on something more than speculation, and that the ten-
dency toward sexual stimulation must be probable and substan-
tial. But we do not agree that the State is limited to the preven-
tion of overt sexual conduct produced by films to the exclusion of
consideration of the stimulating tendency which they may have.
It may be anomalous to treat obscenity differently from other
limitations on free speech, but if so, the difference is one which
has long been accepted.
A third reason for the reversal of the Commercial and Superior cases
may have been that the motion pictures under consideration did not violate
the "primary requirements of decency." This phrase first appeared as
dictum in Near v. Minnesota.' The Court quoted the following passages
from Chaffee's Freedom of Speech: "No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or
the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and loca-
tion of troops." The Court goes on to say, "On similar grounds, the
primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publica-
tions."' In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,' the Court said:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the
fourteenth amendment, it is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
fighting words-those which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'
'American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585
(1954).
-283 U.S. 697, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1930).
It is interesting to note, however, that Chaffee differentiates between these two
grounds for censorship in his Free Speech In the United States. ". . . the law also
punishes a few classes of words like obscenity, profanity, and gross libels upon in-
dividuals, because the very utterance of such words is considered to inflict a present
injury upon listeners, readers, or those defamed, or else to render highly probable an
immediate breach of the peace. This is a very different matter from punishing
words because they eopress ideas which are thought to cause a future danger to the
state."
"'315 U.S. 568, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1941).
'*These words are usually accompanied by an Impressive list of citations to indicate
that other cases, too, have found exceptions to the right of free speech. The cases
cited are ones where the court has permitted either subsequent punishment or prior
restraint for activity alleged by the defendant to be under the protection of the free
speech and press guarantees of the Constitution. Here are some of the cases corn-
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Here, again, Chaffee is the authority cited. This dictim, which appears to
have been derived solely from the works of a lone writer, has been cited
time and time again as a justification for censorship.' Since the Supreme
Court has recently applied this very language in the Burstyn case, it ap-
pears that the "primary requirements of decency" are to be considered in
determining the validity of censorship.
Without attempting to carefully define this nebulous yardstick, we
may suppose that strong language or acts are required to merit prior re-
straint. Chaffee, who seems to have the last word in this immediate area,
says that in determining whether the expression merits prior restraint,
such measures as "lewd," "obscene," "libelous," "insulting or fighting"
and "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are to be employed.
In light of what has been said by qualified critics in regard to one of the
pictures whose censorship was considered, it seems safe to say that the films
in controversy did not violate the "primary requirements of decency."
Since the Burstyn case, which was cited by the Supreme Court as authority
for reversal in their per curium opinion, contains this very language, it
seems reasonable to suppose that this exception to the prohibition of prior
censorship was endorsed by the Court.
We have considered three possible bases for the Supreme Court's re-
versal of the Commercial and Superior cases. It is submitted that any one
alone, or any combination of the three, could have been reason enough for
the Court's decision. Consequently, it is believed by the writer, that
theoretically, motion pictures are still subject to censorship. Before such
censorship will be upheld by the Supreme Court, however, three require-
ments must be fulfilled.
First, the statutes must be carefully limited to insure that no picture
that is not violative of an interest that the state has a right to protect, will
be censored. A second requirement for valid censorship is the existence of
a "clear and present danger" that the motion picture in question will
bring about a serious evil that the state has a right to prevent. The last
requirement demands, at least when the basis for censorship is obscenity or
immorality, that the movie in question violate the "primary requirements
monly found, with the suppressed activity designated parenthetically: Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) (advocating the com-
mission of conspiracy by mass strike to overthrow the government by unlawful
means) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 95 L. Ed. 267, 71 Sup. Ct. 303 (1950)
(making an inflamatory speech to a mixed crowd of negroes to rise up in arms and
fight for equal rights) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L. Ed. 513, 69 Sup. Ct. 448
(1948) (operating a "sound truck" which emitted "loud and raucus noises") ; Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 61 Sup. Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396
(1941) (marching in groups of from 15 to 20 along the sidewalks in the business
district of a populous city) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L. Ed.
1031, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1941) (addressing a person on a public street as a "damned
fascist" and a "damned racketeer") ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 55 L. Ed. 797, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 34 L.R.A. (n. s.) 874 (App. D.C. 1910) (publish-
ing words which constituted a signal to continue an illegal boycott) ; Schenk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L. Ed. 470, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1918) (conspiring to
circulate a pamphlet tending to influence men to obstruct the draft). It is interest-
ing to note that not one of these cases involved censorship of, or punishment for,
expressions against "the primary requirements of decency."
"Commercial Pictures Corporation v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d
502, 510 (1953) ; Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665, 675 (1951) ; Supe-
rior Films v. Department of Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311, 317 (1953).
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of decency." We have pointed out the difficulties attendant to defining
"the primary requirements of decency," and of phrasing statutes to
specifically apply only to pictures which are inimical to the public wel-
fare or public morals. As a practical matter, such a state of perfection
may never be reached, but until it is, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court will continue to prohibit the prior censorship of moving pictures.
EUGENE C. TIDBALL
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY
MONTANA'S NEW INCOME TAX LAW
The 1955 amendments to the income tax laws of the State of Montana
pose interesting problems of constitutionality.
Section 84-4905' now reads in part: "Adjusted gross income shall be
the taxpayer's gross income as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 or as that section shall be labeled or amended. . . ." In a
similar manner the deductions from gross income for determining adjusted
gross income under the federal code are incorporated into the Montana law
by reference to the appropriate section number of the federal code."
Although there are some state not permitting the practice,' the majority
of American jurisdictions, including Montana,' regard incorporation by
reference as an acceptable procedure when the purpose is to pass a law
similar to one that is already in existence in another jurisdiction. This is
not considered to be a delegation of legislative power.' But when an attempt
is made to incorporate into a statute a foreign law as it now appears on the
statute books of the foreign jurisdiction, together with changes thereafter
to be made, the lawmakers are walking on uneasy ground.
Two questions are raised by the Montana amendment which this paper
will consider, namely:
1. Does that part of Section 84-4905, supra, which reads "as that Sec-
tion shall be labeled or amended," render the statute void as an unconstitu-
tional attempt to delegate legislative power to the federal government, by
including future amendments by the United States Congress in the laws of
the State of Montana?
'This section supersedes §§ 84-4906 and 84-4907, REvismri CODES OF MONTANA (1947).
The amended law also includes interest on all state, county, and municipal bonds,
which are not taxed by the federal government. Interest on United States obliga-
tions and dividends on national banks situated in Montana are excluded from the
state tax.
2REv. CODES OF MONT. § 84-4906 states: In computing net income, there shall be al-
lowed as deductions:
(a) The items referred to in §§ 161 and 211 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
or as §§ 161 and 211 shall be labeled or amended, except that state income tax
paid shall not be deductible and also subject to exceptions provided in §
84-4909, relating to items not deductible.
(b) Federal income tax paid within the taxable year. (Note: § 84-4909, supra,
excludes personal expenses, building and property improvements, and pre-
miums on life insurance policies, where taxpayer is a beneficiary.)
3For example, New York: N. Y. Const. Art. III § 17 states: "No act shall be passed
which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or
deemed a part of said act, or shall enact that any existing law or part thereof, shall
be applicable, except by inserting it in such act."
'State v. District Court, 83 Mont. 400, 272 Pac. 525 (1928).
5Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E, 58, 70 A.L,R. 449 (1930).
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